The aim of this paper is to provide a uniform representation of functional concepts used in the field of payment and securities settlement systems. The framework developed here is encompassing the whole field while using as few elements as possible. It provides a basic functional model for analyzing and tracing the life cycle of the financial legs of a transaction. In line with the network properties of the field the model is based on formal graphs. The visualization of these graphs can be considered as a symbolic language. It is shown on the basis of a number of examples that the framework is capable of representing basic notions of payment and securities settlement systems.
Introduction
The field of payment and securities clearing and settlement has undergone major changes in the last decade. The landscape has become more intertwined and geographically more concentrated, partly driven by harmonization of market practices and in Europe the introduction of the euro. Other underlying trends are specialization, outsourcing and concentration of activity in a relatively small number of dominant market players. In order to provide a coherent view on these sometimes complex processes and to keep track of the numerous changes, a uniform framework is needed. However, 1 the use of concepts in the field of payment and securities clearing and settlement is not standardized as there is no generally accepted functional model for clearing and settlement in the literature.
The aim of this paper is therefore to provide a uniform representation of concepts used in the field of payment and securities clearing and settlement. It is noted that we only model part of the complexities in the field as we focus on functional aspects. In section 2 we introduce the settlement problem and the notion of settlement risk. Section 3 provides a generic solution of the settlement problem and section 4 reformulates the whole framework in terms of graphs. In section 5 we present examples of solutions for one-sided transactions such as retail purchases of goods and services and an example for a two-sided transaction: an over-the-counter securities transaction. Section 6 pushes the level of transactions up to examples in the whole-sale segment of payments and arrives at the notion of a formal settlement system. Section 7 concludes and provides suggestions for future research.
The approach taken here is to use notions from graph theory as it appears that drawing graphs is often most helpful in discussions among practitioners in the field. Furthermore given the network properties of the field it is indeed natural to use graph theory. 1 The framework should be encompassing the whole field, and includes among others retail payment schemes, automated clearing houses, large value payment systems, central counterparties, central securities depositories, correspondent banking arrangements and nonbanks in the payments system (see e.g. [3] ).
The Settlement Problem
The paper takes as an axiomatic an economy with agents which have individual financial obligations which they need to settle at a certain date. To this end we first introduce the notion of a transaction (the trade phase) and the fundamental financial risks that arise in the context of concluding these transactions. Secondly, we propose the minimum number of different types of roles that agents need to play in the settlement process (the post trade phase). Thirdly, we formulate the general settlement problem.
Settlement Risk
A transaction takes place between two different agents (clients) 2 , let's say c 1 and c 2 , who want to exchange a good, service or financial asset (called transaction leg) with each other. Let v 1 (t) denote the value of the leg l 1 at time t that c 1 wants to exchange with c 2 at the time the transaction is mutually agreed (and value v 2 (t) for leg l 2 that c 2 wants to exchange in return). That point in time is called the transaction date (t = t T ). 3 We assume that clients also agree on two intended settlement datest s 1 respectivelyt s 2 witht s 1 ,t s 2 ≥ t T . Intended settlement dates may but do not have to coincide. Client c 1 is assumed to expect at t T that ont s 2 she will get l 2 with value v 2 (t T ) (and vice versa for c 2 expecting l 1 with v 1 (t T ) ont s 1 ). To capture a broad definition of the concept of transaction we also allow the value of each of the two sides of the transaction to be time-varying. The actual settlement dates on which the legs of the transaction are settled are denoted by t s 1 and t s 2 . We can then define a transaction as follows: Crucial in the settlement of a transaction is the possible difference between the intended settlement datet s and the actual settlement date t s . The former determines the expectation of each counterparty at t T (ex ante) when the incoming leg (e.g. l 1 for c 2 ) will be settled (i.e.t s 1 ). Ex post there are four possible cases for each one of the legs: settlement was completed on time (t s =t s ), it was late (t s < t s <t s ), it was early (t T ≤ t s <t s ) or no settlement (t s =t s ). We included the case of early settlement for completeness' sake and uset s to denote a point sufficiently far enough away from t T which is needed in case settlement does not take place at all (corresponding to the default case or another failure in general).
Definition 1 (Transaction)
We furthermore introduce the notion of one-sided and two-sided financial transactions depending on the number of financial legs (one or two). In case of a one-sided transaction the non-financial leg is out of scope 4 . We thus exclude pure barter transactions (zero financial legs transactions), transactions in which both legs consist of a good or service and hence no exchange of financial assets has to take place. In Appendix A we have enumerated a large number of cases to show that there are three fundamental financial risks associated with the settlement of transactions: liquidity risk The risk of a party receiving the incoming leg of a transaction early or late (from its client). The cost associated with that risk is that the liquidity position of the party at the day of settlement is different than expected. Especially in case of late settlement the risk is that the remaining lower liquidity position may be insufficient to cover other transactions during the rest of the settlement day. The client must then on very short notice raise liquidity intra-day which may be costly or even impossible in times of stress;
principal risk The risk of a party not receiving the incoming leg of a transaction at all. The costs are then the full amount of the incoming leg at the agreed price on the day of trade, v(t T );
replacement cost risk The risk of a party having to replace an incoming leg of the transaction at a higher price at time t than originally agreed. The cost associated with that risk is the net increase of the market price of the asset, i.e. v(t) − v(t T ).
From Tables 4 and 5 (Appendix A) we conclude that liquidity risk and principal risk may be present in any transaction (one-sided or two-sided, at constant value or time-varying values). Replacement cost risk is only present in two-sided transactions with time-varying values (see Table 6 in Appendix A). In the rest of this paper we will refer in general terms to these three risks as settlement risk of a client. A client is thus exposed to settlement risk with every transaction that he or she wants to conduct but it depends on the kind of transaction which of the three risks are present. Settlement risk exposure is defined as follows: 
The Roles of the Framework
Next we need to define the roles different agents play vis-a-vis settlement risk exposure. Three distinct agent types (or roles) are distinguished in the framework: 3) settlement entity An entity performs the role of settlement entity if it eliminates settlement risk exposure by settling financial obligations of clients or financial intermediaries in its books (book-entry transfer). Examples of settlement entities are banks settling On us payments of its clients, a nostro bank in a corresponding banking arrangement, real time gross settlement systems or securities settlement systems. The n settlement entities (agents with a settlement entity role) are denoted by S i (i = 1, . . . , n) or collectively as the set S.
1) client
In general, if we want to refer to all three role types collectively, we will use R as the set of roles of all agents i.e. R = C ∪I ∪S. The role of the client embodies the "problem owner" or originator of the settlement problem since the client has financial obligations (or conversely a settlement risk exposure on a counterparty) that he or she wants to have discharged (or eliminated). Otherwise, the clients wants apparently to keep the exposure and then there is no settlement risk exposure but a more general form of counterparty risk or custody risk. 5 The other two roles can be viewed as the means through which the settlement problem gets solved. The settlement entity role represents the agent which is capable of settlement i.e. of legally discharging financial obligations of clients, financial intermediaries or other settlement entities (but 5 These risks are outside the scope of this paper.
not itself). 6 To make the framework capable of encompassing all possible infrastructures, it is necessary to introduce a third role -stated above as the financial intermediary role. Financial intermediaries ultimately connect clients with settlement entities. This role is necessary in the (many) cases where clients are not in direct contact with the same settlement entity as is the case for remote payments, point-of-sale payments where the merchant is banking with a bank different from the one that the consumer is using, interbank credit transfers or settlement of securities and foreign exchange transactions.
Furthermore, we also allow for multi-role agents. This means that an entity which performs a higher-numbered role may (but it is not mandatory) also perform lower-numbered roles. However, an agent may perform at a certain time-point only one role (no simultaneity of roles). The notation of a multi-role agent is that the lower-numbered roles are attached between parentheses i.e. a settlement entity S in the role of financial intermediary is denoted by S(I).
Definition of the Settlement Problem
Until now we have described transactions, the financial risks associated with transactions and three different roles of agents that may conduct transactions. With these three ingredients we are able to define the settlement problem of a given day. Loosely speaking, the settlement problem is the set of all settlement risk exposures at some point in time.
The settlement problem can be viewed in two different ways: oriented on the trade day or viewed from the intended settlement day. Centered on the trade day the focus is on the emergence of new settlement risk exposures as new transactions are concluded in the course of the trade day (with different intended settlement days in the future). Viewed from the intended settlement day the focus is on diminishing settlement risk exposure (by way of settling transactions on that day (coming from different trade dates and including failed transactions of previous days (if any)). The two views would largely coincide if for all transactions same day settlement was the norm i.e. settlement on the trade day (t s ≡ t T ). Because of (historical) market practices settlement may be scheduled only some k > 0 days after the trade is concluded witht s = t T + k. For example, for some stock exchanges trade transactions are settled three days later (k = 3). When k > 0 the amount of settlement risk exposure is generally larger than the trades of just one day.
In fact the settlement problem of a given calendar day n can be induced from the settlement problem of the previous calendar day n − 1 by subtracting the risk exposures of settled transactions on n − 1 (including same-day settlement) and adding the risk exposures of new transactions agreed on n. In a general definition of the settlement problem it is therefore necessary to take this recursive or rolling nature of settlement into account over the time interval. However as we need to take also the no settlement case on board the relevant time interval is not fixed. It is not enough to take the interval from trade date to the intended settlement date [t T ,t s ] as settlement may be late; nor from trade date to actual settlement date as settlement may not take place at all. For an individual transaction that did not settle at all we used in section 2.1 the sufficiently long interval [t T ,t s ] but in an aggregate sense considering large amounts of transactions this would imply a really unbounded interval (t s → ∞). To circumvent this we formulate the settlement problem recursively in discrete time as follows. Let SP (n) denote the settlement problem of day n. Further we use three sets of settlement risk exposures. Firstly we denote by NT (n) the set of settlement risk exposures e(n, c i , c j , l j ,t s ) resulting from all new transactions concluded on day n. Secondly, the set ST (n) denotes the set of settlement risk exposures e(t T , c i , c j , l j , n) which vanishes upon settlement on day n. Thirdly, we denote by D(n) the set of settlement risk exposures related to defaults coming into effect on day n. The settlement problem can then formally be stated as follows:
The settlement problem at the end of a given calendar day n (n ≥ 0) is given by: 7
with n = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
Hence, starting with the empty set the settlement problem is a set of settlement risk exposures that grows if new transactions (NT ) come in and decreases through settlement (ST ) or defaults (D). In finding a solution of the settlement problem we treat the two factors new transactions and defaults as exogenous in the sense that we don't pursue the underlying factors. We take the number of new transactions (NT ) and defaults (D) therefore as given.
Solving the Settlement Problem in theory
In this section we develop a general solution for the settlement problem as specified in section 2.3. We first discuss the distinction between value and information and how the three roles interact with respect to that distinction 7 The operator "\" denotes the set-theoretic minus (relative complement) (subsection 3.1). In subsection 3.2 we develop the fundamental notion of settlement itself in the framework. Thirdly, we define the possible information flows among the various actors of the framework and the general solution of the settlement problem (subsection 3.3).
The Distinction between Value and Information
In the field of payments, clearing and settlement it is crucial to clearly distinguish between value and information. [5] The need for the distinction is that we closely associate the manipulation in the ownership of value (i.e. financial assets) with settlement. We will speak of settlement only in those circumstances where the legal ownership changes from one party to another party. The settlement entity role is the only role which handles value and transfers value between agents. 8 The other roles only send and receive information -not value. Nowadays -and the main focus of the framework -IT systems are used for transferring value from one agent to another. The transfer itself is a book-entry transfer, so there are now real flows involved. The act of settlement itself is trivial: debiting one account (subtracting an amount) and crediting another account by adding the same amount (in the same settlement asset). The complexity of solving the settlement problem is therefore not settlement itself but getting the information about transactions and orders to settle those transactions of all agents with the correct intended settlement date at the right time in the settlement day.
In general the settlement problem of day n is considered solved if all transactions with intended settlement datet s = n (and any remaining transactions which did not settle in previous days) have actually settled at the end of settlement day n. The corresponding settlement risk exposures of clients have then been eliminated or alternatively, the corresponding financial obligations of the counterparties of those clients have been fully discharged. Due to the rolling nature of the settlement problem not all settlement risk exposures are taken away at the end of the day but only the exposures of transactions that were due at the latest on that day. 9
The Notion of Value and Settlement
In order to eliminate settlement risk exposures it is necessary that -eventually -a transfer in ownership of value takes place. Here value is meant as a claim on the central bank's liabilities (central bank money), a claim on commercial bank's liabilities (commercial bank money) or a claim on securities held at an account of a central securities depository or custodian. The owner of the claim can be a client or a financial intermediary (on behalf of clients) but a settlement entity itself cannot. More precisely, not in the role of settlement entity; in case of a multi-role agent it is possible for the same agent (in the role of financial intermediary) to hold an account with itself in the role of settlement entity. Each owner of the claim has an account on which the claim is administered; in our framework only settlement entities can administer accounts. The notion of transferring value is closely linked to the notion of settlement account: 
the amount of value) on the account at time t and U is the settlement asset (i.e. the unit of the account).
We say that at the point in time t the holder of the account c i (or as the case may be I j ) is the legal owner of an amount B denominated in the unit of account of U and administered by S k . The settlement entity S k has at least one asset ("money") but possibly many in case S k is a securities settlement system or a multi-currency system. In cases where the settlement asset type is not explicitly needed the fifth argument of a(
The possible operations on a settlement account are opening and closing of the account and debiting and crediting an account. The first two are self-evident, debiting and crediting is defined as follows: Credit operations (an increase in the claim of the client) respectively debit operations (a decrease of the claim of a client) are added resp. subtracted by book-entry transfer in the books of a single settlement entity or as the case may be multiple settlement entities. 10 . Hence, transfer of value takes place by debiting an account and crediting another account with the same amount. Assume a settlement risk exposure e(t T , c 1 , c 2 , l 2 ,t s ) with l 2 having a value of v 2 , then a necessary condition for the elimination of settlement risk exposure by settlement is defined as: This definition of settlement is only a necessary condition as c 2 and c 1 do not know whether the credit or debit has been executed and hence for c 1 to know that the settlement risk exposure has indeed vanished. The sufficient condition for settlement is given in section 3.3.
The Flow of Information
After having introduced the notion of value and settlement in subsection 3.2, we now turn to the means by which the transfer of ownership of financial assets is governed. This is done by sending (and receiving) information messages in a well-structured form between clients, settlement entities and possibly one or more financial intermediaries. The construction of the flow of messages determines the way a client can instruct the settlement entity to perform settlement. An information message needs to be well defined in order to be handled in an unambiguous way -and nowadays common -allowing straight-through processing (i.e. no manual intervention). The definition of an information message needs to be very general as a large variety of messages is needed to model the large array of different solutions to the settlement problem in actual use. We assume that there are at least two information messages, called "debit" and "credit" which will -under certain conditions -induce settlement entities to indeed perform settlement. In this way the "information sphere" is connected to the "value sphere". The information message is defined as follows: We now introduce the idea of a connected information message. A connected message is an ordered pair of messages in which the counterparty receiving the first message is the same counterparty sending the second message and the sequence number of the first message is strictly lower than the sequence number of the second message. For example, the two messages m(nr, id 1 
The notion of connected messages allows an interpretation of the various steps in settling a transaction. In the clearing and settlement field this is known as the instruction life cycle (ILC). In our framework, the instruction life cycle is a set of connected messages. It takes as input settlement risk exposures ("exposure sphere"), during the process it modifies settlement accounts ("value sphere") and produces as output a modified set of settlement risk exposures (which takes us back to the "exposure sphere") with as normal case successful settlement (the problem is solved for that day) or as an exceptional case late or no settlement The ILC thus describes in a step-by-step fashion the "life" of a single transaction from start (on the trade date) to finish (actual settlement date).
In general the steps of the ILC are as follows. The client who initiates the settlement process sends a payment order, usually the debtor, but in the case of direct debit it is the creditor. The payment order is an information message. The payment order is send to zero or more financial intermediaries. 11 At some point the payment order reaches the relevant settlement entity. The settlement entity of the debtor debits the account of the debtor and sends the payment order to the settlement entity of the creditor (via zero or more financial intermediaries). That settlement entity then credits the account of the creditor.
At that point in time the settlement has in fact taken place according to our necessary condition for settlement (definition 6) as the account of the creditor has indeed been credited but the debtor and especially the creditor are not yet aware of that fact. In reality the settlement entities will send information messages signaling to the debtor and creditor that settlement has been completed. This piece of information usually takes the form of an updated statement of account (on paper or electronically) and is called notification of settlement or booking information. In our view it is crucial to include the awareness in the definition of settlement as this enables an agent to recognize that the settlement risk exposure has vanished. Therefore we propose to elaborate the definition of settlement to a sufficient condition as follows: We will now formalize the way to solve the settlement problem of section 2.3, SP (n), but admittedly only at a very abstract level. In order to do that we take the partition of the settlement problem which refers to the current intended settlement day (n =t s ):
Definition 9 (Solution of the Settlement Problem SP (t s )) A solution of the settlement problem for the intended settlement datet s is a set M such that application of M to A(t) yields an updated set A(t + k) which in turn yields a set E(t + k) ⊂ E(t) based on the following sets:
• E of l settlement risk exposures e(t T , c i , c j , l j ,t s ); • A of m settlement accounts a(c i , S j , B,t s , U);
• M of n connected information messages m(nr, id, s, r, b);
This definition states that a solution of the settlement problem reduces the set of settlement risk exposures from E(t) to E(t + k) by updating the set of settlement accounts. This is a weak requirement in order to have a broad solution space. In practice a real, efficient, solution of the settlement problem aims at eliminating all or nearly all settlement risk exposures (see section 5).
The Framework in Graphs
In this section we recapitulate the framework developed in sections 2 and 3. The framework consists of three roles and three relation types. So far we have used concepts of (ordered) sets to describe the framework. Here we formulate it in terms of graphs 12 . It turns out that discussing settlement problems in graph terms is often illuminating given the network character of the field. 13 These labeled graphs can be seen as a symbolic language for expressing a functional model. Furthermore, in order to operationalize the solution of the settlement problem (definition 9), we need to define procedures to change the sets of settlement accounts and settlement risk exposures in a dynamic way. On the basis of the six sets defined in definition 9 we can construct the following six corresponding graph structures and the drawing of these graphs: • A settlement entity vertex S i ∈ S is drawn as a open circle with a double border labeled with Si.
• An example of the visualization of the roles and relations is depicted in Figure 1 . On the left we see agents c 1 , I 1 , S 1 playing the three roles with I 1 and S 1 as a multi-role agent. On the right of the figure we see the three elementary graphs representing a single instance of each role type. We can now generalize definition 10 to obtain the following three graphs: The settlement risk exposure graph G E (t) embodies all outstanding settlement risk exposures at time t that originate from transactions concluded among clients up to t. In general the exposures will carry different intended settlement dates. The initial state of G E is the null graph and G E can be modified by a number of well-defined operations only. Such operations are allowable updates of a graph with defined preconditions and postconditions. The allowable operations are in graph-theoretical sense the addition and removal of a node or an arc and an update of arc labels. The economic interpretation of these operations are given in the first column of Table 1 .
The second graph consists of all the settlement accounts that clients or intermediaries may hold by one or more settlement entities and is called settlement accounts graph: Graph G A (t) embodies all settlement accounts that clients and intermediaries hold with all settlement entities at time t. The economic interpretation is that it provides a complete picture of all balances outstanding at t of all accounts.
The third and final graph is the so-called instruction life cycle graph: The instruction life cycle graph G M has no direct economic interpretation as compared to G E and G A . It is intended as the recipe for solving a particular settlement problem. The specific set of messages and the order in which they are executed determine the operations done on G E and G A . The goal of G M is of course to solve the settlement problem at hand. Solving the settlement problem is done by eliminating the subgraph of G E with all links referring tot s or an earlier intended settlement date through changes in G A and making creditors aware that G A has changed. The arcs of G M are taken from message types that are defined in a so-called message library L. The minimum message library is shown in Table 3 and is the smallest set of message types capable of solving the simplest settlement problem (see section 5.1).
These messages are constructed in such a way that all three graph types can be linked in a mechanical way. The settlement risk exposures in G E are translated into transfer orders by clients which have a financial obligation (i.e. their counterparts are exposed to settlement risk). These transfer orders are the 'start' of the directed graph G M (sources). The transfer orders are then passed on to settlement entities via zero or more transfer instructions of intermediaries. Then the settlement entity performs the debit and credit operations on the relevant edge of the settlement account graph and sends confirmations to the settlement account holder. Then upon receipt of those confirmations the settlement risk exposure graph can be updated. A credit confirmation results in a elimination of an arc in G E .
We can now provide a formal definition of a solution of the settlement problem in graph terms: G M form a solution of settlement problem G E if ∀e(t T , c i , c j , l j ,t s ) This definition states that for each settlement risk exposure, the settlement account of the creditor c i is reachable from the settlement account of debtor c j (condition i) and that the instruction life cycle graph connects c i with c j (condition ii) and that the settlement accounts of the debtor resp. creditor are successfully debited resp. credited (condition iii).
Definition 14 (Graph Solution of the Settlement Problem) G A and
In case it is needed to draw multiple G M or to simplify a large G M , we define an extra feature of G M as follows:
Definition 15 (Abstraction of G M ) An abstraction of G M is the replacement of a subgraph of G M by a single directed edge in order to simplify the drawing of G M . The subgraph must be connected. The begin node and end node of the subgraph are the nodes between which the replacement link is drawn. For this purpose we also add a begin node and end node to definition 13 in case an abstraction is done at the beginning or end of G M . The drawing of the begin and end node is a square with a single border labeled
with "Start" resp. "End".
Solutions to Single Settlement Problems
In this section we describe the class of solutions to single settlement problems applying the uniform framework elaborated in the previous sections. A single settlement problem takes only one settlement risk exposure into account. This can be used to study the basic trajectory of a single transaction. The simplest settlement problem is the single one-sided settlement risk exposure between two clients. In this section we show graphs of the following existing solutions to the single one-sided settlement problem: the credit transfer (On us, via a correspondent and interbank), the cash payment and the direct debit. We conclude by presenting an example of a single twosided settlement problem: an over-the-counter securities transaction using a central counterparty, a central securities depository and a central bank.
The On us Credit Transfer
The simplest case for a book-entry transfer in our framework is a one-sided credit transfer between two clients who have an account with the same settlement entity (S = {S 1 }). This is known as an On us transaction. We have 2 clients (C = {c 1 , c 2 }) with c 2 buying a good for e 10 from c 1 at time t 0 . Client c 1 has thus a settlement risk exposure on c 2 of e 10, E = {e(t 0 , c 1 , c 2 ,e 10, t 5 )}. Suppose that c 1 respectively c 2 have e 15 and e 20 on their accounts at t 0 , then A = {a(c 1 , S 1 , 15, t 0 ,e), a(c 2 , S 1 , 20, t 0 ,e) }. The intended settlement date is at time pointt s = t 5 . In this case there are no intermediaries needed (I = ∅). In Figure 2 
The Cash Payment
Although the framework has been developed for book-entry settlement i.e. where the settlement asset is dematerialized or at least immobilized, it is nonetheless illustrative to show how a one sided transaction to be settled in cash would proceed. Suppose we have exactly the same initial situation as in the On us case of the previous subsection. But now, as c 2 wishes to pay in cash (with a e 10 banknote) we have the case of a settlement asset in bearer form (banknotes and coins) with the issuer being the central bank (hence S = {S 1 }). There is no book-entry transfer possible so there are no messages to be sent i.e. the instructions life cycle graph should be the null graph. However, if we would introduce a "bearer form transfer order message" we can view the amount of cash that each agent carries as the balance or claim vis-a-vis the central bank. Suppose that c 1 respectively c 2 have e 15 and e 20 in their pockets, then A(t) = {a(c 1 , S 1 , 15, t,e), a(c 2 , S 1 , 20 , t,e)} and after c 2 has handed a e 10 banknote over to c 1 the set of settlement accounts would be A(t + 1) = {a(c 1 , S 1 , 25, t + 1,e), a(c 2 , S 1 , 10, t + 1,e)}. Furthermore, in this case there are no intermediaries needed (I = ∅). In fact, the cash payment case is for graphs G E and G A identical to the On us Of course, a complete description of the whole cash circulation process would also need to take into account the fact that clients have to replenish their cash holdings by visiting an ATM and the process of banknote circulation between banks and the central bank. However, this process is not directly linked to the elimination of settlement risk exposures and is therefore not in the scope of this paper.
The Credit Transfer via a Correspondent
In this subsection (and the next) we consider the case where the clients have settlement accounts at different settlement entities. However c 2 still wants to pay via a credit transfer the amount of 10 to c 1 . In this section we consider the correspondent banking solution by assuming that settlement entity S 2 holds an account with settlement entity S 1 (S 1 is the correspondent bank for client bank S 2 ). Here we introduce S 2 as a multi-role agent: it has a role as financial intermediary and as settlement entity. In Figure 3 we have depicted the three graphs for this case. G A now involves two settlement entities with four accounts. One of those accounts is a so-called mirror account. It is an account where S 2 in the role of intermediary holds an account with S 2 in the role of settlement entity. This account is necessary for accounting or technical purposes for transfers between settlement entities. The intermediary role of S 2 is clear from the viewpoint of client c 2 as the transfer order message from c 2 to S 2 initiates a transfer instruction from S 2 to S 1 . From the viewpoint of intermediary S 2 the new transfer order message is analogous as the one from a client to a settlement entity. G E is initially at t 0 identical to the previous two cases as we analyze the same problem but with different solutions. However during the settlement process as visualized in G M we now observe a new phenomenon: there is temporarily a new settlement risk exposure (from S 1 on S 2 ) as S 2 has the obligation to transfer the funds of client c 2 to S 1 . This is called an induced settlement risk exposure i.e. induced by the settlement process. The moment at which the induced settlement risk exposure emerges respectively disappears are here defined as the moment when a mirror account is credited resp. debited.
The Interbank Credit Transfer
Another configuration that can be used to solve the settlement problem where the two clients do not have an account at the same settlement entity is the interbank credit transfer solution. As an extra step in the settlement process (compared to the correspondent banking case) we introduce a third settlement entity which is capable to settle so-called interbank transfers. Here we assume that both settlement entities S 1 and S 2 have an account at another settlement entity S 3 , usually the central bank. In Figure 4 we have depicted the three graphs G E ,G M and G A . The settlement account graph G A is again a little bit more complex as it involves three settlement entities where S 1 and S 2 are both multi-role agents: as a financial intermediary and as a settlement entity. Note that in this case there is also the occurrence of induced settlement risk exposure, as a result of the transfer of value from S 2 to S 1 (S 1 is thus exposed to induced settlement risk).
The Direct Debit
The Direct Debit payment instrument provides yet another solution to the single one-sided settlement problem. Here, the settlement process is initiated at the other side of the settlement risk exposure. In subsections 5.1 through 5.4 the process started with the debtor (i.e. client c 2 ). In the direct debit solution the initiative lies with the creditor (in our example c 1 ). In Figure 5 we have depicted an example of the direct debit instrument combined with a correspondent banking situation so it is assumed that c 1 and c 2 do not have an account at the same settlement entity. Hence, the graphs G E and G A of Figure 5 correspond one-to-one to Figure 3 . The instruction life cycle graph clearly shows that c 1 now initiates the process.
Example of a Two-sided Single Settlement Problem
We now turn to a different settlement problem: the single two-sided settlement problem (at constant values). In this problem two multi-role agentsfinancial intermediaries in their role as client -agree on a transaction involving two financial assets and hence both legs of the transaction are in scope. The example elaborated below is an over-the-counter securities transaction (OTC) i.e. the purchase of a security off-exchange against money for an amount of 50. In Figure 6 the settlement risk exposure graph and the settlement account graph are shown. From G E the two-sidedness is clear as each of the two multi-role agents I 1 and I 2 have a settlement risk exposure on the other (originating at t 0 ). I 1 is the seller of the security and has therefore an exposure on I 2 in cash (labeled as 50C) while buyer I 2 has an exposure in securities on I 1 (labeled as 50S). In the settlement account graph we have taken the assumption that both clients have a securities settlement account with a central securities depository (CSD) for securities 14 (depicted as S 1 ) and an account with a central bank (S 2 ). In Figure 7 the instruction life cycle graph is depicted for the OTCtransaction. In the beginning of the process the transaction is confirmed by both trading parties through a transfer order (messages 1 and 2). The CSD then tries to match both sides of the trade, represented as incoming messages 3 and 4, of its participants in their financial intermediary role. If this is not successful (no match possible) then the process fails (with a confirmation to both participants), otherwise it succeeds (message 7). Then the settlement itself is implemented as a so-called delivery-versus-payment solution (DVP) 15 . This implies that the delivery of the securities takes place if and only if the corresponding payment occurs. The coordination of this process is in Figure 7 carried out by the CSD (S 1 ). The DVP is achieved by verifying the availability of sufficient securities in the account of the seller I 1 (by S 1 through message 8) and sufficient cash in the account of the buyer I 2 (by S 2 through message 9); if this is the case then both accounts are blocked for the corresponding amounts (messages 11 and 12) and then DVP settlement takes place (the set of messages 15 through 19). Otherwise there is insufficient securities and/or cash and the settlement process fails (messages 10 and 13).
Multilateral One-Sided Settlement Problem
In this section we develop the solution of the multilateral one-sided settlement problem. In this problem multiple settlement risk exposures are present among many clients without any restrictions on the pattern of exposures. This implies that the associated settlement risk exposure graph may be cyclic, disconnected or multi-edged (and possibly any combination of these three features). 16 In the real world this set of exposures can usually be found when considering all exposures of clients of a large region (national or international) measured over a calendar day. On this macroeconomic scale the number of exposures to be settled on a single day can easily be in the order of 10 6 . The total value of such exposures can be in the order of e 10 12 . It is clear that the settlement of such large numbers or values of exposures (and conceptually a very large G E calls for a systematic approach: the multilateral one-sided system. In subsection 6.1 we formulate the definition of such a formal system, subsequently in subsection 6.2, we show the solution to the settlement problem as implemented in some existing systems. 
Formal Multilateral One-sided Systems
In developing a formal system definition it is important to keep in mind that a system in our context is not only embodied by the graphs G M (corresponding to an IT platform for sending messages) and G A (as an electronic book-entry system containing the settlement accounts). It is rather the opposite. We view a formal system as a special case of the settlement entity role where the following features are present: a rulebook which defines the rules applicable in the system, a governance authority which has the power to implement, change and enforce the rules of the system 17 , a set of eligible participants and, the above mentioned, instruction life cycle graph G M and settlement account graph G A . In the following definition we provide only the minimum set of rules which would enable solving a multilateral onesided settlement problem. It is of course possible to add other features to the system definition when considering real-world solutions.
Definition 16 (Formal Settlement System F) F is a settlement entity S with the 3-tuple (G, P, R) with:
Governance In the definition of a formal settlement system F the most characteristic feature is finality. This concept makes the concept of settlement irreversible and hence makes sure that once a settlement risk exposure is eliminated it cannot re-emerge by reversing settlement e.g. in case of a default of a participant during the opening hours of the system. Note that the settlement risk exposures (represented by G E ) exist outside the system. If the system is properly designed and operated it should resolve G E by manipulating the graphs G M and G A .
Example of a Multilateral One-sided System
The simplest variant of existing one-sided settlement systems are the socalled Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) systems. In the purest form the system takes during opening hours one transfer order at the time and processes it immediately with one of the following two outcomes: if the transfer order passes the syntax check and is settled with finality in accordance with the rules, settlement is successful. In any other case (e.g. syntax is not correct or there is insufficient balance on the settlement account or a participant involved in the transfer has gone in default) the transfer order is rejected and hence settlement is a failure.
In Figure 8 we show on the left the settlement risk exposure graph at the client level. This graph is disconnected and non-cyclic. We have taken this example to show that even if at client level there are no mutual exposures, it is still possible to have induced interconnectedness at financial intermediary level during the settlement process as the corresponding induced settlement risk exposure graph is cyclical and connected (assuming that at the start of the day the intermediaries submit there transfer orders at the same time). This can be envisaged as the emergence of a form of systemic risk. Whether or not the induced exposures are all connected depends on the structure of the settlement account graph (in the sense of the distribution of clients over the various intermediaries).
The settlement account graph is depicted on the right of Figure 8 . 18 The root of the tree is drawn as an ellipse and labeled S RT GS to denote a formal Real-Time Gross Settlement system in the sense of definition 16 i.e. F = RT GS . The corresponding instruction life cycle is depicted in Figure 9 . In this G M we show for only one of the four transfer orders (transfer order 1) the full message path. This transfer order corresponds to c 5 's exposure on c 1 . The other three are abstracted (according to definition 15) by the compound message "Process" which substitutes for the messages corresponding to 13 through 21.
Looking at the full message path we also have included the application of three system rules (syntax, irrevocability and settlement with finality) which affect the status of a transfer order. The result of applying the syntax rule is incorporated -as the case may be -as message 13 (syntax incorrect, hence reject) or as message 14 (syntax correct hence accept). Then at the node in the graph at which message 14 ends we have the irrevocability point. Just up to this point in the process it is possible to revoke the transfer order (in that case step 15 is relevant) otherwise the transfer order becomes irrevocable (by execution of step 16).
Subsequently, the system S RT GS checks whether the account of c 1 has sufficient balance. If that is not the case settlement fails (message 17) otherwise the account of c 1 is blocked for the exact amount (message 18) and then transfer order 1 is settled with finality in steps 19 and 21. Upon receipt of message 22 resp. compound message 23 the settlement risk exposures in G E of S RT GS on S 1 resp. c 5 on c 1 vanish. This process is then repeated for the transfer orders nr = 2 through nr = 4. To the instruction life cycle we have added a formal start of day and end of day to represent the beginning and end of the settlement day of S RT GS . 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a framework for describing the function of clearing and settlement of payment and securities transactions in a uniform way. The framework consists of two parts: settlement problem formulation and the representation of solutions to such problems. The first part is the formulation of the settlement problem as a set of settlement risk exposures which can be visualized as the settlement risk exposure graph. The second part of the framework consists of two (graph) structures which are capable of representing multiple solutions to a certain settlement problem. The first one is the structure of all settlement accounts (settlement account graph) needed for solving the problem. The second graph structure is the so-called instruction life cycle graph. This is a stepwise description of all messages that have to be sent among agents for obtaining a solution.
In this paper only some relatively simple examples have been developed. The ultimate goal of this research is to demonstrate that by using three agent roles and three relation types it should be possible to model in principle all real world clearing and settlement arrangements for both payments and securities. This is envisaged as part of future research. Firstly, the examples in the paper can be supplemented by studying the guarantee function of central counterparties (which includes the phenomenon of time-varying values of transactions). Secondly, it remains to be seen whether features can be incorporated -without extending the present framework -such as multilateral clearing, the various liquidity saving features of automated clearing houses and settlement systems, interoperable links between central counterparties or in the context of the Single Euro Payments Area the links between socalled Clearing and Settlement Mechanisms. Thirdly, the emphasis of the model so-far is on settlement risk but it would also be interesting to come up with rigorous notions of systemic risk and settlement efficiency relative to the original settlement risk exposures. Table 4 : One-sided Transactions with constant value position of v 1 . The difference at a point in time t between the amount received a(c 2 ) t and the expectation E(c 2 ) t is here taken as the amount of liquidity risk associated with a single one-sided transaction. Secondly, principal risk manifests itself only in one of the four cases, the no settlement case. At a time point arbitrarily far from the intended settlement date (i.e. att s ) the counterparty will update her expectation in the sense that she no longer expects to receive the principal sum v 1 . Principal risk is here defined as the risk that the principal sum is not received at all. In the literature this risk is often termed as a form of credit risk or counterparty credit risk. The term principal risk is usually only used in the context of two-sided transactions. Here we use the term in the one-sided context too as it is the same type of risk. We also conceptually separate liquidity risk from principal risk although in e.g. [6] the definition of credit risk and liquidity risk are overlapping. In case 4 principal risk enters after the intended settlement date but in general this can also occur prior tot s in case of a default (bankruptcy) of counterparty c 1 beforet s . 19 From table 4 we draw the general conclusion that the counterparty who should receive the financial leg in one sided transactions (in this case c 2 ) is inherently exposed to liquidity risk and principal risk as logically speaking there is at least one possible case (cases 2,3 and case 4) in which one of those risks is manifest.
A.2 Two-sided Transactions
Turning to two-sided transactions at constant value (on both sides) we have listed non-exhaustively a number of relevant cases in table 5. We distinguish between transactions in which the intended settlement date is the same and where such dates differ. In the first case at hand with the same intended settlement date (case 5) there is no occurrence of liquidity risk (by definition) as settlement occurs according to expectations but there is liquidity risk in case 6 as counterparty c 2 expects ont s to receive v 1 but it does not happen until later at t s . In the no settlement variant (case 7) liquidity risk is manifest for c 2 at timet s and eventually it becomes clear that there is also a presence of principal risk. Principal risk in two-sided transactions is the risk that a counterparty loses the principal amount of a transaction because the outgoing leg proceeds but the incoming leg does not. In such cases one counterparty has both principal sums and one counterparty none. By definition, in only the latter case principal risk has materialized (as in the former case the counterparty has received the incoming leg of the transaction. In the type transactions with a different intended settlement date (cases 8 through 10) it is now obvious that the counterparties of these transactions are exposed to liquidity risk as well as principal risk. 20 Moreover, with different settlement dates in a transaction the principal risk is even more pronounced compared to same settlement date transactions. Between t s 1 andt s 2 even if everything proceeds as planned c 2 is exposed to principal risk as c 1 has both legs of the transaction during that time interval.
At this point we can incorporate the possibility of transaction legs with assets at time-varying values i.e. to allow market prices of the assets to be settled, to change. We assume that at the trade date both values of an individual two-sided transaction to be exchanged at the settlement date are equal. Over time -between the trade date and the actual settlement date -the market price of an asset in one of the transaction legs may decrease or increase. In those transactions of Table 5 where liquidity risk and/or principal risk actually occurs, then a third risk emerges: replacement cost risk. Replacement cost risk (a form of market risk) is the risk that the market price of an asset is changed when the original transaction has to be replaced by another, e.g. because the market price of the asset has increased in the period when liquidity or principal risk has actually occurred. The replacement costs are thus the extra costs that have to be incurred by a counterparty to obtain eventually the desired asset of the incoming leg of
